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Is There a Way Forward in the
“War over the Family”?
FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS.
By Clare Huntington. New York, New York: Oxford University Press,
2014. 352 pages. $45.00.

Linda C. McClain*
I.

Introduction

A.

Bringing Together Two Conversations About Marriage

In a recent oral argument before the Seventh Circuit about the
constitutionality of Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s laws barring marriage by
same-sex couples and recognition of such marriages, Wisconsin’s assistant
attorney general defended Wisconsin’s marriage laws as part of a “concerted
Wisconsin policy to reduce numbers of children born out of wedlock.”1 In
response, one judge on the panel quipped: “I assume you know how that has
been working out in practice?”2 In a subsequent acerbic and witty opinion
unanimously affirming the federal district court rulings invalidating
Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s restrictive laws, Judge Posner also expressed
incredulity at the argument that excluding same-sex couples from marriage
cohered with the states’ interest in “channeling procreative sex into
(necessarily heterosexual) marriage” to address “the problem of ‘accidental
births’” and “unintended” and “unwanted children.”3 If that channeling
policy were succeeding, he reasoned, “we would expect a drop in the
percentage of children born to an unmarried woman, or at least not an
* Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
I am grateful to June Carbone for constructive comments on an earlier draft and to David
Blankenhorn, Lynn Mather, and Andrew Schepard for instructive conversation about the issues
addressed in this Review and for bibliographical suggestions. I presented an earlier draft at the
workshop, Theorizing the State: The Resources of Vulnerability, held at Emory University School
of Law, and received valuable comments from participants, including Clare Huntington. Thanks
also to Stefanie Weigmann, Assistant Director for Research, Faculty Assistance, and Technology,
Pappas Law Library, for valuable research assistance. A Boston University summer research grant
supported this work.
1. Associated Press, Judges Take Tough Tone at Gay Marriage Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/us/judges-take-tough-tone-at-gay-marriage-hearing.ht
ml?_r=1, archived at http://perma.cc/9QXR-2RKZ. The oral argument is available at: http://media
.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/rt.2.14-2526_08_26_2014.mp3, archived at http://perma.cc/QT7HREQG.
2. Associated Press, supra note 1.
3. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2014).
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increase” since Indiana and Wisconsin adopted their restrictive laws.4
Instead, each state—similar to “the nation as a whole”—has experienced
about a 10% increase from 1997 to 2012, with over 40% of births to
unmarried women.5 Thus, “there is no indication” that the states’ marriage
laws have had any “channeling” effect.6
One effect those laws have had, Posner observed, in seeming conflict
with the states’ “concern” with accidental or unplanned births and “unwanted
children,” is to bar from marriage the “homosexual couples” who are far more
likely than heterosexual couples to adopt those children.7 Indeed, ignoring
adoption was an “extraordinary oversight” in the states’ argument.8 If
marriage between a child’s parents “enhances the child’s prospects for a
happy and successful life,”9 such that “marriage is better for children who are
being brought up by their biological parents, [then] it must be better for
children who are being brought up by their adoptive parents.”10 “The state
should want homosexual couples who adopt children,” as state law permits
them to do, “to be married.”11 Children, “natural conformists” and “upset”
by being out of step “with their peers,” would thereby experience “emotional
comfort” and security.12 United States v. Windsor’s13 child-focused
“criticisms” of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Posner argued, apply
even more forcefully to the complete denial of marriage to same-sex couples:
“The differentiation . . . humiliates tens of thousands of children now being
raised by same-sex couples . . . [and] makes it even more difficult for the
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its
concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”14
Challenges to restrictive marriage laws, Posner concludes, while “[f]ormally”
about discrimination, are, “at a deeper level, . . . about the welfare of
American children.”15

4. Id. at 664.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 654, 662–63.
8. Id. at 662.
9. Id. at 663.
10. Id. at 664.
11. Id. Judge Posner’s emphasis on adoption of “unwanted” children, while strategically
effective, does not acknowledge other pathways to parenthood pursued by same-sex couples, such
as the use of assisted reproductive technology and second parent adoption of one partner’s biological
child. Stu Marvel, The Surprising Resilience of the Traditional Family 7–9 (Dec. 10, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
12. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663–64.
13. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
14. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 659 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
15. Id. at 654.
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The Seventh Circuit oral argument and opinion bring together and
illuminate two conversations about marriage, family law, and equality that
too often proceed independently. In the first, in the numerous post-Windsor
challenges to restrictive marriage laws taking place in courtrooms across the
country, same-sex couples and the courts who rule in their favor emphasize
the high stakes of exclusion by characterizing marriage as a highly esteemed,
incomparable institution and a status that signals one’s intimate commitment
is worthy of equal respect and dignity.16 Defenders of restrictive marriage
laws narrow marriage’s role to channeling otherwise irresponsible
heterosexuals into a stable family form for the sake of the children their
unions may produce.17 That rationale puts same-sex couples—who cannot
become parents by accident—beyond the concerns of the state, which “has
no interest in ‘licensing adults’ love.”18 Even this channeling argument,
however, gives marriage an unrivaled role as the social institution designed
to address a fundamental social problem and to anchor parental investment
in children.19 Judge Posner’s opinion illustrates the twofold rejoinder to that
argument: (1) this reductive view of marriage ignores the actual content of
state marriage laws, which indicate that “[t]he state must think marriage
valuable for something other than just procreation,” and (2) if the state
regards marriage as the optimal family form for child rearing, then allowing
same-sex couples to marry advances marriage’s child-protective functions
and spares children humiliation and tangible deprivations.20 To be left out of
marriage is to experience a second class form of family life and (as another
federal appellate court put it) to be “prohibit[ed] . . . from participating fully
in our society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot countenance.”21
Parallel to this exaltation of marriage in rulings that bring more families
under marriage’s protective umbrella is a second discourse about the

16. Windsor provides a template for this. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (stating that DOMA
interferes with “the equal dignity of same-sex marriages” conferred by New York’s law); id. at 2692
(describing how marriage by a same-sex couple is a “relationship deemed by the State worthy of
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages”).
17. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing and rejecting
“Proponents’ attempts to differentiate same-sex couples from other couples who cannot procreate
accidentally”); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 394 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Virginia’s argument).
19. In his influential account, Carl Schneider proposed: “[I]n the channelling function the law
creates or (more often) supports social institutions [such as marriage and parenthood] which are
thought to serve desirable ends.” Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 498 (1992); see also Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby
Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2135–
37 (2007) (considering the continuing relevance of the channeling function in litigation over samesex marriage and in challenges to “the conventional sequences of love, marriage, and the baby
carriage”).
20. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 659, 662.
21. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384.
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disappearance of marriage from the lives of a growing number of people and
communities in the United States.22 “[T]he share of American adults who
have never been married is at an historic high,” while the “shares of adults
cohabiting and raising children outside of marriage have increased
significantly.”23 Too many young adults, policy analysts warn, are “drifting”
into sex and parenthood unintentionally and outside of marriage.24 Reports
of a growing class-, race-, and gender-based marriage divide stress the
urgency of this “other marriage equality problem.”25 This discourse also
warns of the “diverging destinies” of children born into or reared in marital
versus nonmarital families26 and of the “reproduction of inequalities” as these
patterns continue across generations. 27 Policy analysts debate whether it is
possible to close the marriage gap or whether changes in economic
conditions, values (or social norms), and gender patterns are such that a more
realistic policy is to move “beyond marriage” and to aim instead at cultivating
a “new ethic of responsible parenthood.”28
The Seventh Circuit opinion brings together these two pieces of the
marriage puzzle by examining the incentive effects, or influence, of state
laws on patterns of family life. It also invites holistic consideration of
whether a state’s family laws cohere as a whole and achieve the aims of
securing “the welfare of American children.”29 That the state laws at issue
were those of Indiana and Wisconsin serendipitously introduces the

22. See generally NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT & CTR. FOR MARRIAGE & FAMILIES, THE STATE
OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2010: WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW MIDDLE
AMERICA (2010); PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES
(2010).
23. WENDY WANG & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., RECORD SHARE OF AMERICANS
HAVE NEVER MARRIED: AS VALUES, ECONOMICS AND GENDER PATTERNS CHANGE 4 (2014),
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-24_Never-Married-Ameri
cans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H4SD-U2GT.
24. Isabel V. Sawhill, Opinion, Beyond Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, http://nytimes
.com/2014/09/14/opinion/sunday/beyond-marriage.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/RF8BFJY7 [hereinafter Sawhill, Beyond Marriage]. See generally ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION
UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE (2014) [hereinafter
SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND].
25. For this coinage, see Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 921, 924 (2013).
26. See Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 611, 614 (2004) (arguing that differences in the
childbirth trajectories of the least- and most-educated women are leading to children of single
mothers losing resources, while children born to more affluent (usually married) women are gaining
resources).
27. See Sara McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction of
Inequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257, 271 (2008) (“[T]he evidence suggests that recent changes in
the family are contributing to the intergenerational persistence of inequality.”).
28. Sawhill, Beyond Marriage, supra note 24; see also WANG & PARKER, supra note 23, at 4–
5 (attributing the rising share of never married to changes in values, economics, and gender
patterns).
29. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
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relevance of “welfare” to child welfare and family law: Zablocki v. Redhail,30
in which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Wisconsin’s efforts to
encourage responsible fatherhood by linking access to marriage to paying
child support and keeping one’s children off welfare,31 is a cornerstone in
arguments in marriage equality litigation that the “fundamental” right to
marry is “expansive” and “broad” rather than narrow.32 In the 1990s, Tommy
Thompson, Governor of Wisconsin, was a poster child for experimenting
with welfare reform to encourage “individual responsibility.”33 Indiana is the
home state of former Vice President Dan Quayle, an iconic figure in the
1990s welfare debates who linked intergenerational poverty to a “poverty of
values”34 and invited endless commentary on whether he was “right” or
“wrong” for criticizing television character Murphy Brown’s decision to
have a nonmarital child as setting a bad example for young women to create
fatherless families.35
In Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family Relationships,
family law scholar Clare Huntington issues a similar invitation to assess
holistically the impact of family law on families and, particularly, on
children. That inventory, she argues, yields dismal conclusions about the
law’s failure to foster “family well-being” and “strengthen family
relationships.”36 Huntington indicts both “dispute-resolution family law”—
that is, the “legal rules governing divorce, paternity, child abuse, and other

30. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
31. Id. at 388–91.
32. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *12 (9th Cir.
Oct. 7, 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Zablocki as rejecting a “narrow” right to marry,
such as “the right of fathers with unpaid child support obligations to marry”); Bostic v. Schaefer,
760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Zablocki to support a “broad right to marry that is not
circumscribed based on the characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that right”).
33. See States’ Perspective on Welfare Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 104th
Cong. 18 (1995) (statement of Hon. Tommy G. Thompson, Governor of the State of Wisconsin)
(characterizing welfare reform in Wisconsin as “demand[ing] individual responsibility from welfare
recipients”). President George W. Bush subsequently appointed Thompson Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Former Wisconsin Governor Tommy G. Thompson Becomes New Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Feb. 2, 2001), available at http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010202.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/JF6A-9HJV.
34. Vice President Dan Quayle, Speech on Cities and Poverty at the Commonwealth Club of
California (May 19, 1992), in N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/1992/05/20/us/after-the-riots-excerpts-from-vice-president-s-speech-on-cities-and-poverty.ht
ml, archived at http://perma.cc/9ETU-TUCD.
35. Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle Says Riots Sprang from Lack of Family Values, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 1992, at A1, A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/20/us/after-the-riotsexcerpts-from-vice-president-s-speech-on-cities-and-poverty.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M6
HK-U4VG. For an example of commentary, see generally Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle
Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 1993, at 47, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/maga
zine/archive/1993/04/dan-quayle-was-right/307015/, archived at http://perma.cc/DR3X-5TT2.
36. CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS xiii (2014).
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kinds of family conflicts”37—and “structural family law,”38 within which she
includes not only the conventional subject matter of family law—such as
rules about marriage and parenthood—but also the many forms of legal
regulation that “influence[] the context for relationships”—such as zoning
laws, employment discrimination laws, and criminal laws.39 “[C]ontext
matters,” Huntington argues, because “relationships do not exist in a
vacuum.”40 Huntington challenges readers to think holistically and broadly
about the role of law in shaping family life.
Huntington enlists positive psychology to explain why relationships
matter to individuals and society and under what circumstances such
relationships develop.41 Thus, the normative vision that should guide family
law is “that family law in all of its aspects should nurture strong, stable,
positive relationships.”42 She contends that, while a “few narrow reforms”
are moving family toward that vision, they will remain “haphazard,
unconnected, and sometimes actively challenged” without the “overarching
theory of family law” that she proposes to unite them “and encourage more
complete change.”43
B.

A Propitious Juncture in the “War over the Family”?

Failure to Flourish arrives at a peculiar, and perhaps propitious,
juncture in long-running public conversations about the relationship among
family life, family values, and family law when it is possible to ask about a
way forward to end the “war over the family.”44 For decades, a disturbing
contradiction or paradox in state and federal family law and policy was that,
even as government sought to shore up marriage and “responsible
fatherhood” to address the “failure of families to form” (single-parent
families) and the rise in “broken families” (due to divorce), it excluded samesex couples from marriage to “defend” marriage and often hindered lesbians
and gay men and their children from forming legally protected families.45
That legal landscape is rapidly, although not uniformly, changing to welcome
same-sex couples into the marriage fold. Yet, as the Seventh Circuit
opinion’s appeal to demographic trends made clear, governments have not

37. Id. at xi.
38. Id. at xii.
39. Id.
40. Id. at xi.
41. Id. at 6–11.
42. Id. at xvii.
43. Id. at xvi–xvii.
44. For more on this formulation, see generally BRIGETTE BERGER & PETER L. BERGER, THE
WAR OVER THE FAMILY (1983); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 121–30 (1991); DAVID POPENOE, WAR OVER THE FAMILY (2005).
45. On this paradox, see Linda C. McClain, Federal Family Policy and Family Values from
Clinton to Obama, 1992–2012 and Beyond, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1621, 1624–25.
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managed to halt or reverse those trends and bring everyone into the big
marriage tent.
Sawhill proposes the terms “traditionalists” and “village builders” to
capture a basic divide about how best to respond to the separation of marriage
and parenthood and whether to try to bring everyone into that tent.46
“Traditionalists” generally “share a deep concern about the fragmentation of
the family and its implications for adults and especially for children” and,
thus, view strengthening marriage and restoring a norm of childbearing and
parenting within marriage as the best way forward.47 They include many
conservatives who believe that “government does more harm than good” and
that its programs often undermine marriage and parental responsibility.48
“Village builders” focus less on family form than on the basic proposition
that “families exist within a larger society that must take some responsibility
for helping parents to raise their children;” they insist that “[w]ithout the right
supports from the larger community, . . . families”—particularly singleparent families—“will not flourish.”49
Where does Failure to Flourish position itself in this shifting landscape?
Is Huntington more of a traditionalist or village builder? Like Judge Posner,
Huntington invokes child well-being to condemn legal barriers to marriage
for same-sex couples who wish to marry.50 Like the attorneys defending
Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s marriage laws, and like the traditionalists Sawhill
describes, she also insists that family form matters for children, observing:
“There is overwhelming evidence that children raised by single or cohabiting
parents have worse outcomes than children raised by married, biological
parents.”51 Unlike them, she pulls back from championing marriage as the
necessary or sole solution to the problem of anchoring parental commitment
and cooperation in childrearing.52 Instead, a “flourishing family law” should
support a broad range of families and aim not at marriage, as such, but at
stable and committed relationships between coparents, so that they “can meet
the needs of their children.”53 Huntington, thus, is emphatically a “village
builder” as she details the many ways that the state should support families.54

46. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND, supra note 24, at 7, 83–84.
47. Id. at 84–85.
48. Id. at 84.
49. Id. at 87. As an example of a village builder, Sawhill cites to Hillary Clinton’s It Takes a
Village, discussed infra at note 67.
50. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 171–73.
51. Id. at 31.
52. See, e.g., id. at 176 (“[T]he goal is not necessarily to increase the number of marriages but
rather to increase the long-term commitment between parents, whatever the form.”).
53. Id. at 179–80.
54. For an informative exchange between Huntington and the author relating Failure to
Flourish to Sawhill’s categories, compare Linda C. McClain, On “Traditionalists,” “Village
Builders,” and the Future of Children, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 1, 2014, 5:36 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/on-traditionalists-village-builders-and.html,
archived
at
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In this Review, I will explore whether Failure to Flourish offers a viable
way forward beyond the “war over the family” by offering a new baseline for
conversation. I will also argue that, while Failure to Flourish persuasively
insists that “context matters,” it is surprisingly acontexual in ways that limit
its ambitious effort to guide family law. Failure to Flourish is, at times,
admirably fine grained, using portraits of particular families to illustrate how
family law shapes their lives and describing specific initiatives as harbingers
of a flourishing family law.55 On the other hand, the book articulates a
normative vision of the “pervasive state” fostering “strong, stable and
positive relationships” without considering the context of decades of calls by
various social movements to “strengthen families” and state and federal
policies aimed at doing so. It gestures toward an ecological approach to
families and family law, even calling for a relationship impact statement by
analogy to an environmental impact statement when considering law and
policy, without situating that call in the context of decades of calls for a shift
from family policy to family ecology.56 The book cautions that government
cannot do it all, gesturing toward the vital role of neighborhoods, religious
organizations, and other nongovernmental actors but does not engage with
the significant turn in recent decades to enlist civil society and public–private
partnerships to help families and address problems government alone can’t
solve. Readers could better appreciate and evaluate Huntington’s vision of a
pervasive state properly directed in aid of human flourishing if they had a
better sense of how she situates her own project in the context of these
numerous other ones. At this point in the family law–family values conversation, there is no clean slate on which to write. Context, indeed, matters.
This Review will also argue that Failure to Flourish’s critique of
dispute-resolution family law as negative, adversarial, and destructive of
family relationships is acontexual. With respect to divorce and family
dissolution, for example, prominent trends—or even revolutions—in family
law in the direction Huntington favors date back twenty years or more.
Huntington does not explain why she regards as “islands in a sea of
dysfunction”57 reforms in this area that other family law scholars identify as
institutionalized enough to represent a paradigm shift from an adversary
model of warring attorneys and parents to a problem-solving model aimed at

http://perma.cc/9RZP-DY5L, with Clare Huntington, Tempered Support for a Cultural Change
Agenda, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 3, 2014, 10:12 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/temperedsupport-for-cultural-change.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C5FF-SEA8.
55. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 55–58 (sketching portraits of three families to illustrate
how “the state is present in the lives of all families”); id. at 165–85 (offering examples of how to
implement a “flourishing family law”).
56. For discussion, see infra Part III.
57. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 108.
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facilitating coparenting and reducing parental conflict.58 As it were, this shift
aims at a way forward not in the war over the family, but in handling
acrimony and conflict between family members in a way more conducive to
peaceful coparenting and child well-being.59 The impulse to call for sweeping away a harmful paradigm to make way for a better one is understandable
but somewhat misdirected and unnecessary. If family law, in significant
ways, has shifted in the direction Huntington advocates, then it might be more
fruitful to focus on how better to instantiate that positive vision and what
obstacles may hinder its realization. Indeed, whether or not Failure to
Flourish presents an accurate diagnosis, many of its prescriptions are
appealing and could be pushed even further. The book is more useful, I will
suggest, in describing the foundation of a new system, already in place, that
should be extended than in its description of the current system as mired in
the past.
In Part II, I explicate some features of Huntington’s argument and
highlight valuable contributions the book makes. In Part III, I will attempt
to situate Huntington’s diagnosis of the state of the family and her call to
action in the context of certain developments in the “war over the family.” I
will ask whether her prescriptive vision goes far enough. In Part IV, I will
argue that her critique of dispute-resolution family law is too negative and
will try to situate her call for flourishing family law in the context of wellestablished trends in family law.
II.

From Negative to Flourishing Family Law

Families matter—or, as Huntington puts it, “relationships matter”—to
the individuals in them as well as to society.60 The prominent rhetorical place
given to families in every presidential campaign amply demonstrates the
common premise that (as I have written elsewhere) “a significant link exists
between the state of families and the state of the nation, and that strong,
healthy families undergird a strong nation,” while “the weakening of families
both reflects and leads to moral and civic decline and imposes significant

58. See infra Part IV. To be clear: in this Review I am focusing primarily on dispute-resolution
law concerning family dissolution, that is, divorce and post-dissolution rules concerning
coparenting. I am not evaluating Huntington’s diagnosis of dispute-resolution family law in the
context of child welfare or adoption and surrogacy proceedings. For a review focused on the child
welfare context, see generally Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
Apr. 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519722, archived at http://perma.cc/EM2U5A8F.
59. My inspiration for this imagery is Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.: A Preliminary
Report and a Model Statute on an Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and
Separating Parents, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131 (1993).
60. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 6–7 (describing the correlation between close
interpersonal relationships and individual well-being).
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costs on society.”61 Thus, when Huntington, after inventorying the
challenges facing different types of American families, concludes “[t]he state
of the American family is not good,”62 she joins a sizeable roster of observers
from across the political spectrum and across the decades who have sounded
the alarm about American families in crisis and the implications of that crisis
for the social and political order.63 Huntington justifies her primary focus on
“the family relationships that affect and involve children” because it is for
children (particularly young children) that family relationships are so
influential.64 When she contends that “[t]he problem facing society . . . is
that too often families are unable to provide children with the kinds of
relationships that are essential for healthy development and in turn create
engaged, productive citizens,”65 she echoes arguments made by family law
scholars and social movements that stress the formative role played by
families in fostering the capacity of children for “responsible democratic and
personal self-government.”66 Reminiscent of Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Huntington invokes the proverb “[i]t takes a village to raise a child,” arguing
that families depend upon neighborhoods, communities, workplaces, and the
state in order to flourish.67
A distinctive feature of Huntington’s call to action on behalf of families
is her enlisting of the insights of positive psychology. Children need “strong
and stable relationships,” as the literature on human attachment teaches.68
They also need “positive” relationships that are not abusive and in which the
parent is “responsive” to the child’s needs “much of the time.”69 Adults, too,
she argues, need strong, stable, and positive relationships, and a critical
element of child well-being is that coparents have such a relationship.70
To support “strong” relationships, family law should grant legal
recognition to a “broader range of families” than the traditional nuclear
family, such as same-sex couples who seek to marry and families formed
through assisted reproductive technology.71 Huntington continues:

61. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2006).
62. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 54.
63. See generally MCCLAIN, supra note 61 (surveying the concerns regarding the weakening
of families in the civil society revival movement, the marriage movement, and the welfare reform
debates).
64. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xvi.
65. Id. at 1.
66. MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 15–17.
67. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 158; see also HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A
VILLAGE (10th anniversary ed. 2006).
68. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 18.
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 20–21.
71. Id. at xv.
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To foster stable relationships, structural family law should encourage
long-term commitment between parents—commitment to each other
or at least commitment to the shared work of raising children. To
foster positive relationships, structural family law should make subtle
but crucial changes to the context in which families live . . . [to]
increase family interaction and build social ties between families and
the larger community.72
Huntington proposes that family law be informed by appreciation of
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein’s idea of the “cycle of intimacy,” which people
experience “repeatedly” in their lifetimes:73
A widespread human experience is that individuals experience love,
inevitably transgress against those they love, feel guilt about the
transgression, and then seek to repair the damage. Individuals
experience this cycle repeatedly throughout their lifetimes, with
transgressions ranging from the minor, such as parents raising their
voices to their children, to the more egregious, such as an individual
undermining a marriage.
In healthy parent-child and adult
relationships, a person is able to acknowledge the transgression and
then seeks to repair the damage.74
Measured by that framework, family law, “[w]ith a few exceptions, . . .
is fundamentally negative.”75 Instead of helping with the work of repair,
dispute-resolution family law focuses on “rupture without repair.”76 Custody
battles are zero sum and fail to help parents repair their relationship so they
can successfully coparent after the legal divorce.77
Structural family law, the numerous ways in which law structures family
life, takes a “largely reactive stance toward family well-being, expecting
families to build [strong, stable, positive] relationships on their own” and
then “wait[ing] for a crisis and then interven[ing] in a heavy-handed
manner.”78
Huntington acknowledges “narrow reforms” to structural and disputeresolution family law in the direction she recommends.79 She contends,
however, that these “are best understood as islands in a sea of dysfunction.”80
A “basic reorientation” and new vision are in order: a “flourishing” family

72. Id.
73. Id. at 21, 235 n.138.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 108.
76. Id. at 83.
77. Id. at 88–91.
78. Id. at 92–93. As noted above, I will focus on Huntington’s critique of the family dissolution
aspect of dispute-resolution family law rather than the child welfare, abuse and neglect, and other
aspects.
79. Id. at 106.
80. Id. at 108.
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law “should strive to foster strong, stable, positive relationships from the
beginning.”81 This entails “changing . . . the way the state resolves the
inevitable conflicts that mark family life”—dispute-resolution family law—
and changing “the broader structural relationship between families and the
state”—structural family law.82
Failure to Flourish deserves praise for urging a broader conception of
family law that includes the numerous ways the state influences families and
family life. That broader definition, Huntington argues, is “essential if we
want to think more creatively about how the state can nurture strong, stable,
positive relationships.”83 A related valuable feature of Failure to Flourish:
the idea of the pervasive state, which reaches the family not only through
“direct regulation,” but also “influences families indirectly through
incentives and subsidies, ‘choice architecture,’ myriad laws and policies
seemingly unrelated to the family, and by shaping social norms.”84
Perceiving that “state regulation of family life is deep and broad,”85
Huntington argues, is “essential for rethinking how the state should influence
families.”86 Thus, the fruitful debate is not whether or not the state is
pervasive or that it is acting; instead, “[t]he goal is to figure out how best to
redirect this pervasive state so that it encourages strong, stable, positive
relationships within the family.”87 These insights about the pervasive state
are a useful addition to a significant body of theoretical work by family law
scholars on the state, including, for example, Maxine Eichner’s argument for
a “supportive state” and Martha Fineman’s theory of the “responsive state.”88
III. Enlisting the State to Encourage Strong Family Relationships: Some
Context
If the public policy debates and initiatives of the last several decades
yield any lessons, one might be to ponder whether and how the pervasive
state can nurture or encourage strong, stable, and positive relationships.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 80.
See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 4–9 (2010) (developing a liberal democratic “normative account of
the family-state relationship” that amends liberalism to “recognize the dependency of the human
condition” and the role of the state in “supporting caretaking and human developments . . . so that
citizens can lead full, dignified lives, both individually and collectively”); Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 262–63, 273–75
(2010) (critiquing the universal and autonomous “liberal subject” and liberal conceptions of
autonomy and arguing for grounding conception of a “responsive” state and of how societal
institutions allocate resources around the “vulnerable subject”).
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Given the pervasive theme of “strengthening families” in several social
movements and developments in law and policy, it would be instructive to
know what Huntington thinks these efforts got right or wrong, and what
lessons, if any, we might glean from these earlier and ongoing initatives about
family flourishing. Is the failure to promote flourishing families a failure of
vision or of implementing the vision?
A.

Is It Finally Time for a Shift from “Family Policy” to “Family
Ecology”?

An attractive feature of Huntington’s normative vision is its interest in
the social environments that allow children to flourish and also, in the face
of adversity, to be resilient. She uses imagery of a “web of care” that
“provides critical support for parents in their caregiving responsibilities” and
cautions that “too often the web is frayed by environments that do not help
neighbors build social connections.”89 Another attractive feature is her
recognition that government can’t do it all and that institutions of civil society
play an important part.90 “The saying ‘[i]t takes a village to raise a child’ is
shopworn,” she concedes, “but the basic idea is sound.”91
Readers may have a sharp sense of déjà vu with respect to this appeal to
an ecological model and the need to enlist civil society and “the village” to
help families. For example, in 1991, family law scholar Mary Ann Glendon
proposed “a shift from family policy to family ecology.”92 She asked whether
it was possible to move from “the war over the family”—between the
“cultural right” and “cultural left”93—toward a “sensible American family
policy” that would put “children at the center” in recognition of “the high
public interest in the nurture and education of citizens.”94 Glendon frequently
used imagery of “fraying” social networks and environment to highlight the
urgent need to take an ecological perspective.95
Enlisting Urie Bronfenbrenner’s work on the ecology of human
development, she urged that public deliberation about families should focus
on “interconnected environments” and how “[j]ust as individual identity and
well-being are influenced by conditions within families, families themselves
89. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 158.
90. See id. at 146–49 (examining the mutual dependency of the state and families in
successfully achieving the essential work of raising children).
91. Id. at 158.
92. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
130 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
93. See id. at 121 (exploring the political battle over family policy between the “cultural right,”
which defends and imagines, as the “basic social unit,” the “traditional” family based on marriage
between a husband–breadwinner and wife–homemaker, and the “cultural left,” which rejects the
traditional family as patriarchal and oppressive and instead views the individual as the basic social
unit and speaks more of “families” as including nontraditional forms of family).
94. Id. at 126.
95. E.g., id. at 135.
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are sensitive to conditions within surrounding networks of groups—
neighborhoods, workplaces, churches, schools, and other associations.”96
Glendon urged that taking this “more comprehensive view” would be a
helpful way to move beyond a “verbal war over the family to . . . reasoning
together about conditions of family life.”97 As does Huntington, Glendon
stresses the important implications for an ecological approach of the famous
thirty-year study of nearly 700 infants born in the Hawaiian state of Kauai,98
one-third of which were “classified as high-risk because of exposure to
perinatal stress and other factors such as poverty, low parental education, an
alcoholic or mentally ill parent, or divorce.”99 As Huntington reports,
“[d]espite these life circumstances, a third of the children in the high-risk
category developed into competent, caring adults” and the “distinguishing
factor” for those better outcomes was that the children “had emotional
support from extended family, neighbors, teachers, or church groups, and
they had at least one close friend.”100 For Glendon:
[T]he Kauai study challenges us to reflect on the relative absence of
public deliberation concerning the state of the social structures within
which we learn the liberal virtues and practice the skills of
government; . . . [and] the diverse groups that share with families the
task of nurturing, educating and inspiring the next generation.101
Other family law scholars, notably Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, have
developed a child-centered ecological approach to family and child welfare
law.102 I focus on Glendon because her environmental or ecological approach
subsequently shaped two social movements in which she participated: the

96. Id. at 130.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 130–33 (emphasizing that the study’s conclusions about what helped children
overcome adversity show “the importance of keeping . . . interacting social subsystems in view” in
public deliberations about the family).
99. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 12.
100. Id. Thus, Huntington praises the efforts of a reformer deeply influenced by Urie
Bronfenbrenner’s idea of “human ecology and the networks that form among parents and others
who care for children.” Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. GLENDON, supra note 92, at 134.
102. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone:
Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 818–19 (2009) (linking the wellbeing of children with other vulnerable groups and arguing that by providing for the needs of
children and their caregivers, all will benefit).
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“responsive communitarian” movement, launched in 1991,103 and the civil
society revival movement of the late 1990s.104
Like Huntington, these movements worried about the well-being of
children and argued that family form matters for parents engaging in, as
Huntington puts it, their “critical child-development work.”105 Although the
civil society movement did not speak precisely of strong, stable, and positive
relationships, it stressed the formative role of families in teaching basic
qualities important for relationships and for citizenship.106 Noting the risks
of a weakened social ecology, civil society movement leaders urged: “As a
nation, we must commit ourselves to the proposition that every child should
be raised in an intact two-parent family, whenever possible, and by one caring
and competent adult at the very least.”107 The marriage movement
emphasized better (on average) child outcomes as well as the better social
health of married adults as reasons why all levels of government should
“[m]ake supporting and promoting marriage an explicit goal of domestic
policy.”108
To be sure, Huntington would quickly distance her own position from
at least some aspects of these family- and child-focused social movements,
noting that flourishing family law’s goal of fostering stable, strong, and
positive relationships between coparents and parents and children does not
equate simply to promoting marriage.109 Fair enough. My point is that
Huntington’s implicit embrace of an ecological approach to family
103. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and
Responsibilities, in THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 251 (1993) [hereinafter Communitarian Platform]
(outlining the Communitarian perspective on the family, education, communities, and the polity and
identifying Mary Ann Glendon as a coauthor of the platform issued on November 18, 1991).
104. See generally COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC’Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY
NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS 6 (1998) [hereinafter A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY] (describing “civil society”
as the best “conceptual framework” for “the moral renewal” of democracy).
105. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 159–63; see also Communitarian Platform, supra note
103, at 257 (“[T]he weight of the historical, sociological, and psychological evidence suggests that
on average two-parent families are better able to discharge their child-raising duties if only because
there are more hands—and voices—available for the task.”).
106. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 104, at 7.
107. NAT’L COMM’N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: HOW CIVIC
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 13 (1998).
108. INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 10,
22 (2000) [hereinafter THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT], available at http://americanvalues.org/cata
log/pdfs/marriagemovement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5KQ8-NMRV.
109. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 176–80. I have engaged critically elsewhere with all three
of these movements. See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 20–48 (2013) (challenging dichotomous treatment of rights and
responsibilities in the responsive communitarian movement); id. at 93–106 (posing questions about
several core tenets of the civil society revival movement); MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 62, 75
(critiquing the civil society movement for its inattention to inequality within the family and its
ambivalence about sex equality); id. at 118–54 (critiquing the marriage movement and
governmental marriage promotion for inattention to the relationship between marriage quality and
sex equality and failing to embrace sex equality as a component of “healthy marriage”).
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flourishing has some striking antecedents. Does she see any connection
between her vision and these prior prescriptions? Further, to the extent that
those earlier proposals influenced concrete family policy—for example, calls
for marriage education and promotion, responsible fatherhood initiatives, and
divorce reform—what, if anything, might we learn about successes or failures
of a “pervasive state” at fostering relationships?
B.

“Putting the Brakes on” Divorce: Why Not Do More to Encourage
Reconciliation?

If family law, as Huntington urges, should do more to repair
relationships, then the tantalizing question arises: do earlier proposals to do
more to save marriages warrant reconsideration? Over two decades ago,
political philosopher and presidential advisor William Galston (prominent in
the communitarian, civil society, and marriage movements) argued that given
the effects of divorce on children, “it would be reasonable to introduce
‘braking’ mechanisms that require parents contemplating divorce to pause
for reflection.”110 Even if that “pause for reflection” did not “succeed in
warding off divorce,” it afforded time for the couple to “resolv[e] crucial
details of the divorce,”111 with their “first obligation to decide the future of
their children before settling questions of property and maintenance.”112
Further, “[b]y encouraging parents to look at the consequences of a family
breakup rather than at the alleged cause or excuse for it,” the hope is that
“couples will improve their prospects of saving the marriage.”113
Perhaps a family law focused on repair should do more to save
marriages for the sake of the children. On the one hand, Huntington resists
this, characterizing the requirement in some states that courts “attempt to
reconcile a couple filing for divorce” as a “superficial attempt to ‘repair’ the
relationship.”114 She reasons that “[b]y the time one person in the couple has
initiated divorce proceedings, the time for reconciliation is typically over,”
so that “[t]he real focus for the repair should be on the future relationship of
the couple as coparents.”115 On the other hand, in the following passage she
ponders what the state might do when “[i]t may be in a child’s interests for

110. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 286 (1991).
111. Id. at 286–87 (quoting Marilyn Gardner, Putting Children First—The New English
Precedent, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 1990, at 14, available at http://www.csmonitor
.com/1990/0330/pgar30.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JWC8-EHFY) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
112. Id. at 286.
113. Id. (quoting Gardner, supra note 111) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 117–18.
115. Id. at 118.
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the mother and father to stay together . . . but not necessarily in the parents’
interests”:116
Setting aside a case of domestic violence, where separation makes
good sense, commitment between adults is one of the situations
where family law should first try to align the interests of the family
by encouraging the parents to develop a stronger relationship with
each other. But in the absence of that, family law should still
prioritize the child’s needs. “Staying together for the sake of the
children” may seem outdated, but given the alternatives for the
child, there is something to this intuition. This is not to say that the
state should require couples to stay together or make it particularly
difficult for them to exit a relationship, but there are more indirect
ways for the state to encourage long-term commitment . . . .117
Family law students, in my experience, typically react with disbelief to
the argument that, from the perspective of child outcomes, it is better in a
low-conflict marriage that parents do not divorce and that it may even be
better, eventually, for adults.118 Surely, they argue, children will sense if their
parents are unhappy! What kind of an example will such parents set for
forming healthy adult relationships? Nonetheless, if family law should
encourage long-term adult commitment, including postdissolution, so that
children benefit from a strong coparenting relationship, why not do more to
discourage divorce and heal marriages? Why not try, given the “marriagego-round”—that those who divorce often remarry or repartner, leading to
children experiencing one or more family transitions with new adults in the
household and attendant instability?119
What might Huntington say about the more extensive vision of family
repair offered in the recent Institute for American Values report, Second
Chances: A Proposal to Reduce Unnecessary Divorce, coauthored by
William J. Doherty, a family studies scholar and experienced family
therapist, and Leah Ward Sears, former chief justice of the Georgia Supreme
Court?120 The authors counter the premise that divorce “happens only after

116. Id. at 156–57.
117. Id. at 157.
118. See generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 148 (2000)
(“[R]esearch suggests that marriage is a dynamic relationship; even the unhappiest of couples who
grimly stick it out for the sake of the children can find happiness together a few years down the
road.”).
119. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND 10–11 (2009) (arguing that
conflicting American cultural ideals about marriage lead to a cycle of marriage, divorce, and
remarriage that results in a less stable home environment and worse outcomes for children).
120. WILLIAM J. DOHERTY & LEAH WARD SEARS, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, SECOND CHANCES:
A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE UNNECESSARY DIVORCE (2011), available at http://american
values.org/catalog/pdfs/second-chances.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5L54-LHA4.
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a long process of misery and conflict.”121 Instead, research finds that “[m]ost
divorced couples report average happiness and low levels of conflict in their
marriages,”122 such that “divorces with the greatest potential to harm children
occur in marriages that have the greatest potential for reconciliation.”123
Filling a gap in research, Doherty and his colleagues asked nearly 2,500
divorcing parents, after they had taken their required parenting classes, “if
they would be interested in exploring marital reconciliation with professional
help.”124 The study found that “[a]bout one in four individual parents
indicated some belief . . . that their marriage could still be saved, and in about
one in nine couples both partners did.”125 If a “significant minority” of
individuals and couples “expressed interest in learning more about
reconciliation” that far into the divorce process, Doherty and Sears suggest,
then “the proportion of couples open to reconciliation might be even higher
at the outset of the divorce process—before the process itself has caused
additional strife.”126 For example, another study by Doherty and colleagues
found that “about one-third of married people who had ever reported low
marital happiness later on experienced a turnaround.”127
Doherty and Sears propose that states adopt a one-year waiting period
for divorce, and, if the couple has children, they must complete a marriagedissolution program before filing for divorce.128 That program must include,
along with “information on constructive parenting in the dissolution process”
and skills to “increase cooperation and diminish conflict” and information on
alternatives to litigation, “information on the option of reconciliation” and
resources to assist interested couples with reconciliation.129 With such
measures, family law could return to an earlier (but short-lived) focus by
family court professionals on reconciliation.130 This type of education seems
consistent with Huntington’s emphasis on repair. After all, as Huntington
mentions, the original vision of no-fault divorce was therapeutic:131 people in
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (citing Paul R. Amato & Bryndl Holmann-Marriott, A
Comparison of High- and Low-Distress Marriages that End in Divorce, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
621 (2007)).
123. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alan Booth & Paul R. Amato, Parental Predivorce
Relations and Offspring Postdivorce Well-Being, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 197, 211 (2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 15–16 (emphasis omitted) (citing William J. Doherty et al., Interest in Marital
Reconciliation Among Divorcing Parents, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 313, 313–14 (2011)).
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 17, 19 (discussing Jared R. Anderson, Mark J. Van Ryzin & William J. Doherty,
Developmental Trajectories of Marital Happiness in Continuously Married Individuals: A GroupBased Modeling Approach, 24 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 587 (2010)).
128. Id. at 20, 33–34.
129. Id. at 46–47.
130. Id. at 15.
131. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 274 n.119.
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“dead” marriages should be able to end them without having to allege fault,
and courts and helping professions should focus their energies on saving
marriages that could be saved.132 Isn’t Huntington’s advocacy of a cycle of
intimacy all the more reason to prevent divorce, when possible, by helping
people save—repair—their marriages, particularly when they have children?
What might Huntington think of another measure proposed by Doherty and
Sears, an Early Notification and Divorce Prevention Letter, which would start
the clock running on the one-year waiting period, while informing the other
spouse that the marriage “has serious problems” that may lead to separation
and divorce; stating that the sender wants the marriage “to survive and
flourish”; and asking whether the other spouse is willing to work on the
problems in the marriage with appropriate professional help, “save” the
marriage, and make it healthy?133
Of course, there is an important gender dimension to this prescription:
women initiate the majority of unilateral divorces.134 One reason is that
women’s happiness, health, and other benefits from marriage are more
sensitive to marriage quality.135 There is also a class dimension, since, as one
marriage movement document reports, “more educated and affluent
Americans are now markedly more likely to succeed in marriage than their
less privileged fellow citizens.”136
C.

Limits to What Government Can Do: Enlisting Civil Society and
Public–Private Partnerships

Familiar slogans in family-values rhetoric, particularly in presidential
speeches of recent decades, are that government doesn’t raise children,
parents do, and should; government can’t love and nurture.137 Another
slogan—that there are problems that government alone can’t solve138—has

132. J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 118 (1997).
133. DOHERTY & SEARS, supra note 120, at 29 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 22–23.
135. MARGARET F. BRINIG, FAMILY, LAW, AND COMMUNITY: SUPPORTING THE COVENANT
60, 69 (2010); FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 109, at 100; INST. FOR AM. VALUES & NAT’L
MARRIAGE PROJECT, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: THIRTY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 31–32 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS]; MCCLAIN, supra note 61,
at 134–35.
136. WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS, supra note 135, at 16.
137. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7456, 3 C.F.R. 255 (July 21, 2001) (“Government cannot
replace the love and nurturing of committed parents that are essential for a child’s well-being.”);
President George H.W. Bush, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican
National Convention (Aug. 20, 1992) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/ws/?pid=21352), archived at http://perma.cc/75FJ-VFQC (“[W]hen it comes to raising children,
Government doesn’t know best; parents know best.”).
138. See Governor William J. Clinton, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the
Democratic National Convention (July 16, 1992) (transcript available at http://www.presidency
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translated into intense interest in public–private partnerships in recent
decades. It is a puzzle why Huntington does not situate her vision of family
flourishing in the context of these trends, explaining points of continuity and
discontinuity. For example, she clarifies that she is not arguing that “the state
can and should do everything.”139 Rather: “Other entities and institutions
play a significant role in helping families flourish. For example, faith
communities, informal support networks, and community groups play
essential roles in nurturing strong, stable, positive relationships.”140 She
offers a positive example of the nonprofit organization KaBOOM! becoming
a partner with communities to build playgrounds.141 Noting that the United
States has a long history of “this kind of community effort,” she argues that
“[t]he most important role for the state in this context is to support, not
supplant, this civic engagement.”142
Huntington’s brief statement that government should “support, not
supplant” echoes a prominent theme in numerous calls to enlist civil society
and public–private partnerships to build social capital, strengthen families
and communities, and deliver goods and services.143 For example, the
responsive community and civil society movements called for the use of
public–private partnerships to empower vulnerable communities and
cautioned that government should support rather than replace social
subsystems.144 Huntington’s vision also resonates with the idea of
subsidiarity—“that the smallest possible unit should . . . address a problem
and a larger unit should step in to provide aid only if that smaller unit
otherwise would fail”145—an inspiration for President George W. Bush’s
faith-based initiative.146 President Bill Clinton insisted that there are certain
tasks that government simply cannot do, or certainly cannot do as well as
nongovernmental actors.147 Drawing on Bronfenbrenner, Hillary Clinton—

.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25958), archived at http://perma.cc/7ZV3-ZCTR (“There is not a program in
government for every problem . . . .”).
139. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 220.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 220–21.
142. Id. at 221.
143. See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 109, at 104–06 (arguing that “[c]ivil society should
support democratic self-government, not supplant it”); Linda C. McClain, Unleashing or
Harnessing “Armies of Compassion”?: Reflections on the Faith-Based Initiative, 39 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 361, 368–69 (2008) (describing President George W. Bush’s “faith-based initiative” as calling
for a more coordinated national effort to enlist public–private partnerships to meet social needs in
America’s communities).
144. FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 109, at 104–06.
145. Id. at 105. Some family law and child welfare scholars also appeal to this principle. See
generally Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reframing the Legal
Framework to Capture the Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 247 (2011).
146. See McClain, supra note 143, at 366–67 (describing how proponents of faith-based
initatives appeal to subsidiarity).
147. Clinton, supra note 138.
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Sawhill’s prime example of a “village builder”148—called for an “ecological
or environmental approach” or “child in the village model” that looked at all
the different ways civil society and government could support the well-being
of children.149
By now, the call for enlisting civil society in public–private partnerships
has transformed the federal government itself, which has an Office of FaithBased and Neighborhood Partnerships that coordinates with related “centers”
in a number of federal agencies.150 If the pervasive state should “support”
civic engagement in ways that contribute to families’ positive relationships
and “foster pluralism . . . by supporting a variety of different nonprofit
institutions,”151 then some evaluation of government’s actual deployment to
date of these partnerships and funding of various nongovernmental
organizations would be instructive.
D.

A New Baseline for Argument About Family Forms?

Back in the 1990s, at the height of the “family values” wars, many
feminist and left/liberal family scholars and commentators warned about
appeals to a social science “consensus” about either family form or family
values and the risks of generalizations.152 They wrote books in defense of
single-parent families and against constructing single mothers as
pathological or deviant.153 Sociologists and journalists offered fine-grained
empirical accounts of the lives of single mothers in America and why they

148. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND, supra note 24, at 87.
149. CLINTON, supra note 67, at 314–15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. About the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, OFF. FAITH-BASED &
NEIGHBORHOOD P’SHIPS, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/about, archived at
http://perma.cc/NTK8-YXMG.
151. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 221.
152. See, e.g., Judith Stacey, The Father Fixation, UTNE READER, Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 72, 72
[hereinafter Stacey, Father Fixation], available at http://www.utne.com/politics/fretting-aboutfatherlessness-american-nuclear-family.aspx#axzz3MHP4DG5e, archived at http://perma.cc/RJ32TFJJ (“As a sociologist, I can attest that there is absolutely no consensus among social scientists on
family values, on the superiority of the heterosexual nuclear family, or on the supposed evil effects
of fatherlessness.”); Judith Stacey, The New Family Values Crusaders, NATION, July 25–Aug. 1,
1994, at 119, 119–22 (criticizing arguments on family values claimed to be based on social science
consensus).
153. See, e.g., NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES xi–xix (1997)
(recounting her own decision to become a single parent and calling for a shift from stigmatizing to
supporting single-parent families); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 21–24, 101–06 (1995) (arguing
that the dominant patriarchal ideology constructs “family” around heterosexual monogamous
marriage, rendering as “deviant” mothers outside of that family form); DOROTHY ROBERTS,
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 217–25
(1997) (challenging the “conservative vision” of single mothers, particularly of black, single
mothers, as immoral and harmful and critiquing “myths about welfare and reproduction” that drove
punitive welfare reform in the 1990s).
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separated motherhood from marriage.154 Family historians and social
scientists countered the rhetoric of the crisis of “fatherless America” as
harming children and driving America’s most urgent social problems155 with
positive accounts of family diversity and calls for more inclusive social
values reflecting support and respect for diverse families.156
Failure to Flourish signals a new baseline for and tenor of conversation
about family form. To be sure, Huntington embraces values of diversity and
pluralism and an “ecumenical” approach to family form, which does not
insist on the marital family as the normative model.157 Nonetheless, her book
contains many passages about the advantages and better outcomes for
children of a stable, marital, biological, two-parent family and the
disadvantages and worse outcomes experienced by children in single parent
and “complex family structures” that could readily be found in position
papers and calls to action by many traditionalists groups concerned with
shoring up marriage and intact, two-parent families for the sake of child wellbeing158—statements to which feminist and left-of-center scholars and
advocates reacted.159 For example, she asserts: “As much as liberals might

154. See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 16–19 (1997) (exploring the issues faced by unskilled
single mothers earning wages below the poverty line); MELISSA LUDTKE, ON OUR OWN:
UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD IN AMERICA xi–xii (1997) (using the author’s personal experiences as
a single mother as an entry into examining the experiences of unmarried teen mothers and older,
unwed mothers). Although the book was not published until 2005, the findings of Kathryn Edin’s
coauthored book with Maria Kefalas, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005), influenced later welfare-reauthorization debates. See
MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 143–44 (noting Edin’s congressional testimony).
155. DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM 1 (1995).
156. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH
AMERICA’S CHANGING FAMILIES 3, 9 (1997) (breaking down negative misconceptions about family
diversity); Stacey, Father Fixation, supra note 152, at 73 (arguing that “family diversity is here to
stay” and pointing to evidence of positive outcomes for children reared by gay and lesbian parents).
157. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xix (“Accordingly, this book addresses relationships
that go beyond the traditional nuclear family of a married mother and father living with their
biological or adopted children.”).
158. Compare id. at 31–34 (canvassing the “overwhelming evidence that children raised by
single or cohabiting parents have worse outcomes than children raised by married, biological
parents”), with THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 108, at 10–11 (summarizing social science
research that “children do better, on average, when they are raised by their own two married parents”
and that children raised in single-parent households are more likely to have a range of negative
outcomes).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 152–56. Among those reactions, I include my own
earlier criticism of the marriage movement and governmental marriage promotion:
The marriage movement’s repeated references to a “consensus” on the benefits of
marriage and the harms of nonmarital family forms may illustrate a “feedback loop”:
a group of social scientists cite repeatedly to each other’s work so that a certain set of
claims is presented as an “uncontested” consensus, even if there is credible social
science to the contrary.
MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 128.
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wish otherwise, there is mounting evidence that family structure is a causal
factor, among others, affecting child outcomes.”160 Another striking parallel
to earlier discourse about strengthening families is her frequent warnings that
society will either “pay now or pay later” to help families and that “we are
already paying for the costs associated with poorly functioning families.”161
Once again, the intersection of the two sides of the marriage equality
issue (highlighted by the Seventh Circuit oral argument) is notable.
Huntington concludes: “[T]here is ample evidence that, with the exception of
families headed by same-sex couples, children raised by two married,
biological parents have better outcomes than children raised in other family
structures.”162 Thus, as same-sex couples challenging state restrictions on
marriage argue, and as judges conclude, there is a robust consensus that
quality of parenting, not gender, is what matters for child outcomes.163 And
those couples do not attempt to dethrone marriage as the primary social
institution for rearing children. To the contrary, taking a cue from Justice
Anthony Kennedy, they argue that their children suffer harm, humiliation,
and stigma where their parents’ relationship is not dignified as a marriage.164

160. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 204.
161. Id. at xvii. On the appeal to “costs” in this earlier discourse, see Linda C. McClain,
“Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 360 (1996) (“In the rhetoric of irresponsible
reproduction, one charge common to all three targets described above—single mothers, welfare
mothers, and teen mothers—is that such family forms are costly for children, for society, and for
men’s roles as fathers.”).
162. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 35 (emphasis added).
163. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (favorably quoting
testimony that “quality of parenting” rather than “gender” is the key), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.
2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-574); id. at 771 (“[T]he
overwhelming weight of the scientific evidence supports the ‘no differences’ viewpoint.”). In
reversing the federal district court, the Sixth Circuit majority opinion accepted the responsible
procreation rationale as satisfying rational basis review for constitutionality, while observing that
evidence (such as that presented at trial) about the capacity of “gay couples” to raise children
supported the “policy argument” for extending marriage laws to such couples. DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388, 404–08 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14574). By contrast, the dissent quoted Baskin’s sharp critique of the responsible procreation rationale
as “so full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously.” Id. at 430 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (quoting
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent
also concluded that the extensive trial record about child outcomes supported the district court’s
determination that “the amendment [barring marriage by same-sex couples and marriage
recognition] is in no way related to the asserted state interest in ensuring an optimal environment
for child-rearing.” Id. at 424–27.
164. Specifically, Justice Kennedy’s Windsor majority opinion. United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“[The Defense of Marriage Act] humiliates tens of thousands of children
now being raised by same-sex couples.”); see also Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14-CV-00089-TMB,
2014 WL 5089399, at *2 (D. Alaska Oct. 12, 2014) (“The Plaintiffs argue that the laws’ effect
stigmatizes same-sex couples and their children by relegating them to a ‘second class status’ . . . .”).
Illustrative is a complaint filed shortly after Windsor, which cited the crucial language from Justice
Kennedy’s opinion. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 10,
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (No. 1:13-CV-1861). As the Complaint
alleges:
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And a nearly unbroken stream of federal courts agree, including Judge
Posner, as discussed above.
Will this exaltation of marriage for same-sex couples who are parents
create a “new illegitimacy” for other pathways to parenthood and forms of
family life?165 Will the availability of marriage for same-sex couples lead to
even more emphasis on the importance of two-parent families?
What is the new consensus about family form that should guide a
flourishing family law? Might it end the “war over the family”? What is the
place of marriage in that new consensus? Huntington emphasizes
encouraging “long-term commitment” between parents in coparenting
relationships, not encouraging marriage per se.166 Marriage equality
discourse emphasizes the wrongful exclusion of same-sex couples from “the
common vocabulary of family life and belonging that other[s] [] may take for
granted,”167 a rhetoric that affirms rather than challenges the favored place of
marriage as a setting for adult commitment and child rearing. As the Ninth
Circuit recently put it, stressing the role of marriage not only in bringing, but
in keeping, a couple together: “Raising children is hard; marriage supports
same-sex couples in parenting their children, just as it does opposite-sex
couples.”168
In a significant turning point in the war over the family, David
Blankenhorn, president of the Institute of American Values and a prominent
leader of the marriage movement who publicly announced he now supported
same-sex marriage, has joined with journalist and same-sex marriage
proponent Jonathan Rauch to call for a “new conversation” about
strengthening marriage that supports marriage for same-sex couples and a
marriage opportunity agenda to address the growing marriage divide.169 Is
this a sound way to help foster strong, stable, and positive relationships that
Huntington could support? Or is policy analyst Isabel Sawhill, a veteran of

[Plaintiffs] and their children are stigmatized and relegated to a second class status by
being barred from marriage. The exclusion ‘tells [same-sex] couples and all the world
that their relationships are unworthy’ of recognition. [Windsor] at 2694. And it
‘humiliates the . . . children now being raised by same-sex couples’ . . . . Id.
Id.
165. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 387, 389 (2012).
166. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 177 (“Deciding that the state should encourage a longterm commitment between parents does not necessarily mean that the state should focus only on
marriage.”).
167. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *3 (9th Cir.
Oct. 7, 2014) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Governor Otter’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014) (No. 1:13cv-00482-CWD)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at *6.
169. Inst. for Am. Values, A Call for a New Conversation on Marriage, PROPOSITIONS, Winter
2013, at 1, 2–5, available at http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/2013-01.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/6EZF-BH5E.
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the 1990s welfare and “family values” debates and a leader in efforts to end
teen and unplanned pregnancy, correct that the “genie is out of the bottle”
with respect to the separation of marriage and parenthood, so that, rather than
seeking to restore marriage as “the standard way to raise children,” the aim
should be “a new ethic of responsible parenthood”?170 Naomi Cahn and June
Carbone have also called for a “responsible parenthood” model, although
they have observed that when people follow that model of investing in
education and avoiding early pregnancy and parenthood, they tend to have
children within marriage.171
If it is a fool’s errand to try to reconnect marriage and parenthood
because both limited economic prospects and changed social norms are at
work (which government programs have not done much to alter), then
perhaps the focus should be on the front end, or prevention: facilitating
greater access to the most effective and much better contraception and
instilling an ethic that means “not having a child before you and your partner
really want one and have thought about how you will care for that child.”172
Or, as Blankenhorn counters, perhaps it is too soon to give up on marriage—
which, rather than “disappearing, [is] fracturing along class lines”—and it
may be more realistic to try to promote a responsible parenthood ethic with
the assistance of the social institution of marriage than as simply a matter of
individual responsibility?173 Why not pair, Rauch argues, Sawhill’s emphasis
on effective contraception with improving access to marriage and
strengthening a marriage culture?174
A valuable role that Failure to Flourish may play in this new landscape
is to invite a holistic look at family formation and parenthood and the aims
of a flourishing family law. The argument, made in marriage equality
litigation, that marriage channels all those casual heterosexual relationships
that result in accidental pregnancy and childbearing into stable, marital
families is a fantasy not, as Posner observed, borne out in reality.175
Nonetheless, the underlying social problem of unstable family circumstances
that impact child well-being is real and warrants attention.

170. Sawhill, Beyond Marriage, supra note 24.
171. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 170–89 (2010) (discussing the benefits of
improved sex education and contraception access).
172. Sawhill, Beyond Marriage, supra note 24.
173. David Blankenhorn, Don’t Give Up on Marriage Now, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 10, 2014,
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/865612822/Dont-give-up-on-marriage-now.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/C2B5-S4A3.
174. Jonathan Rauch, Don’t Give Up on Marriage Yet, SOC. MOBILITY MEMOS, BROOKINGS
INST. (Oct. 16, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos
/posts/2014/10/16-dont-give-up-on-marriage-rauch, archived at http://perma.cc/8L8L-35PG. For
Huntington’s qualified support for Sawhill’s approach, see Huntington, supra note 54.
175. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
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Huntington, like some other family law and feminist scholars, seeks to
attend more to the plight of unmarried fathers and to encourage stable and
positive coparenting relationships without necessarily aiming at marriage.176
The vivid ethnographic stories of the lives and worldviews of the low-income
fathers profiled by Kathryn Edin and Timothy J. Nelson in Doing the Best I
Can: Fatherhood in the Inner City are inspiring such work.177
Given this concern over low-income fathers, it would be useful to know
what lessons, if any, Huntington thinks that a flourishing family law might
glean from the intense focus since the 1990s on using welfare funds as a tool
to strengthen families by promoting “responsible fatherhood” as “integral to
successful child rearing and the well-being of children.”178
Those efforts target father absence and articulate the premise that a
healthy start for a child requires the nurture and support of both parents. Just
as Huntington urges that fathers matter for more than economic
contributions, one recent White House report by the Obama Administration
defined responsible fatherhood as “actively contributing to a child’s healthy
development, sharing economic responsibilities, and cooperating with a
child’s mother in addressing the full range of a child’s and family’s needs.”179
The George W. Bush Administration similarly declared that fathers have
“emotional” as well as “financial commitments” and that “[d]ads play
indispensable roles that cannot be measured in dollars and cents: nurturer,
mentor, disciplinarian, moral instructor, and skills coach, among other
roles.”180 Huntington acknowledges (in a footnote) that funding for healthy
marriage and responsible fatherhood traces back to the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005.181 However, there is a much longer history of governmental and

176. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xiv–xv, 190–92; see also Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men
as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L.
REV. 511, 513 (2013) (offering an inventory of the “barriers to father-presence for nonresident lowincome court-involved men” and proposing ways the legal system could address those barriers). An
earlier work attending to low-income fathers and supporting a model of fatherhood focused more
on active parenting than financial support is NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD (2000).
177. KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE
INNER CITY (2013). On the influence of this book, see, for example, HUNTINGTON, supra note 36,
at 190–92 (discussing the dynamic in nonmarital relationships); Kohn, supra note 176, at 522–23
(discussing the “light” the book sheds on relationships between unmarried parents). Nancy Dowd,
who has long championed redefining fatherhood around caretaking rather than breadwinning, also
finds Edin and Nelson’s book inspiring in terms of fathers’ engagement with their children.
Remarks at Workshop on Theorizing the State at Emory University School of Law (Dec. 6, 2014).
178. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31025, FATHERHOOD
INITIATIVES: CONNECTING FATHERS TO THEIR CHILDREN 1 (2014) (quoting Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. § 101
(1996) (enacted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 2 (2012).
180. SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 178, at 2 (quoting EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A
BLUEPRINT FOR NEW BEGINNINGS: A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S PRIORITIES 75
(2001)).
181. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 292 n.32.
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nongovernmental efforts, at various levels, to encourage responsible
fatherhood, and it would be useful to consider whether any lessons or best
practices emerge from that experience.182 For example, her call to focus not
on marriage but on stable coparenting relationships has important precedents
in debates about how best to encourage responsible fatherhood: through
promoting marriage as the proper site of such fatherhood or through
“strengthening families as they exist,” including addressing education and
economic barriers to healthy relationships, which will benefit adults and
children even if such efforts do not lead to marriage.183 This latter approach,
which focused more on capacity building, resonates with Huntington’s and
certainly makes sense given what she calls challenges facing the “complex
family structures” of families formed by unmarried parents.184
Underlying this issue, however, are questions of class and power. In
Marriage Markets: How Inequality is Remaking the American Family, June
Carbone and Naomi Cahn observe that part of what has made marriages
“healthier” at the top of the income spectrum is the fact that high-income men
outnumber the high-income women the men view as desirable partners.185
This creates a better relationship market for the most successful women while
the men, who invest more time and money in their children than the fathers
of a half century ago, also enjoy greater rights at divorce, including shared
parenting.186 The combination of the two encourages marriage, deters
divorce, and promotes family stability.
Carbone and Cahn argue that, in contrast, women find men without jobs
to be poor candidates for marriage; in communities in which the women
greatly outnumber the men who make good partners, relationship quality,
married or unmarried, suffers.187 The women, who increasingly outearn the
men and still do more for the children, gain greater relationship power the
more that they control access to children.188 Carbone and Cahn object that
most of the efforts to promote paternal involvement come at the expense of
182. See McClain, supra note 161, at 389 & n.209 (observing the emergence of “a new ‘social
movement’ . . . calling for ‘responsible fatherhood’ and diagnosing ‘fatherlessness’ as a central, if
not the ‘most urgent,’ social problem driving an array of other social ills” and listing associated
organizations, including the National Fatherhood Initiative, National Institute for Responsible
Fatherhood, Family Revitalization, and Promise Keepers).
183. MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 141 (quoting Ronald Mincy, What About Black Fathers?,
AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 7, 2002, http://prospect.org/article/what-about-black-fathers, archived at
http://perma.cc/5LQJ-YFGF) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xviii.
185. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 62–63 (2014).
186. Id. at 118.
187. See id. at 72–73 (summarizing sociological research that shows a decline in relationship
quality among unmarried couples when male-to-female ratios fall).
188. See id. at 130–31 (finding that an unmarried father’s “continuing relationship with his
children depends on how he manages the relationship with the mother” and the mother’s
“willingness to allow access” depends on economic and noneconomic factors).
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women’s hard fought autonomy.189 “Repairing” relationships is unlikely to
work in the face of a mismatch between men and women.
E.

Marriage Education: Worth a Second Look?

Like Huntington and some other family law and feminist scholars, I
have been skeptical about governmental promotion of marriage and
responsible fatherhood, particularly given some of the gender role
assumptions of marriage and fatherhood agendas and (until recently) the
exclusion of same-sex couples.190 When the federal government dedicated
funds to marriage promotion, I argued that “[f]acilitating the relationship
decisions of persons considering marriage, and teaching them skills that may
contribute to a successful marriage, differs from trying to persuade persons
not seeking to marry to do so.”191
Nonetheless, if one takes to heart Failure to Flourish’s call for a more
preventive family law that does more at the front end to promote strong,
stable, and positive relationships, perhaps efforts at relationship education
and marriage education deserve another look as a means of helping both
adult–adult and parent–child relationships. In 2006, the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005 opened up dedicated streams of funding for such efforts.192 By
now, many states have marriage commissions and initiatives and produce
educational materials, and the federal government funds a National Healthy
Marriage Resource Center.193 The marriage movement also championed
such education, both through the efforts of faith communities and through
government subsidies, as a way to improve marital quality and reduce
divorce.194
A basic premise of such education is that the skills and knowledge
necessary for a healthy relationship can be taught and that, as a Florida
booklet for marrying couples puts it: “Once relationship skills are learned,
they are generalized to parenting, the workplace, schools, neighborhoods,
and civic relationships.”195 Pertinent to Huntington’s proposed focus on the
cycle of intimacy, which recognizes the inevitability of conflict, these
materials typically stress that all relationships have conflicts; how people
189. Id. at 133.
190. MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 117–19.
191. Id. at 130.
192. See supra note 181.
193. NAT’L HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org/
index.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3CJJ-6PRP.
194. THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 108, at 20–23.
195. FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE FLA. BAR, FAMILY LAW HANDBOOK 1, available at
http://www.flclerks.com/PDF/2000_2001_pdfs/7-99_VERSION_Family_Law_Handbook.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G9ZW-S2MR; see also Diane Sollee, Where Are We Going?, in
MARRIAGE: JUST A PIECE OF PAPER? 372, 376, 381 (Katherine Anderson et al. eds., 2002) (urging
that we think of marriage as a “skill-based relationship” and that a “skills set” can help people to
keep marriages together).
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handle conflict in a relationship distinguishes healthy from unhealthy
relationships.196 At first, some of these materials were laughable (whether or
not intentionally so),197 but by now states are producing booklets written by
respected experts in sociology, family studies, and family and marriage
education and counseling.198 Indeed, Carbone and Cahn conclude that
“effective” marriage education that “encourage[s] students to look for the
warning signs of domestic violence, learn how to keep the lines of
communication open, and insist on mutual respect” might contribute to
“relationship stability.”199 It would be instructive to see how Huntington
might grade these materials measured against her vision for what the
“pervasive” state should be doing. Are these materials overly intrusive on a
couple’s relationship, which is none of government’s business? Or simply
ineffectual? Or might they be, as one of my married Family Law students
put it, “pure gold,” when it comes to preparing young people for the
challenges of married life?
IV. Dispute-Resolution Family Law: Islands in a Sea of Dysfunction or a
Velvet Revolution?
Failure to Flourish views dispute-resolution family law as
fundamentally negative. This is a baffling diagnosis at least with respect to
the family dissolution process where divorcing parents have minor children.
Huntington argues that dispute-resolution family law uses an inapt adversary
model, does little to repair relationships to foster coparenting, and that
lawyers practicing family law are particularly destructive of relationships.200
Far more persuasive is Jana Singer’s observation that “[o]ver the past two
decades, there has been a paradigm shift in the way the legal system handles
most family disputes—particularly disputes involving children”—from a
“law-oriented and judge-focused adversary model” to a “more collaborative,
interdisciplinary, and forward-looking family dispute resolution regime.”201

196. See, e.g., Sollee, supra note 195, at 377 (“The most important skill set is how to handle
disagreement, since all couples fight.”).
197. My personal favorite is a video, The Marriage News You Can Use, in which the fictional
news station C-Wed featured reporters giving marriage advice. Video tape: The Marriage News
You Can Use (Utah Department of Workforce Services 2002) (on file with author).
198. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT, LA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., MARRIAGE
MATTERS!: A GUIDE FOR LOUISIANA COUPLES, available at http://www.dss.state.la.us/assets/docs
/searchable/OFS/GuideMarriageChild/MarriageMatters.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RU5F-3T
KP. Theodora Ooms was the senior consultant on the project that produced MARRIAGE MATTERS!,
and the coauthors were Ooms, Scott Stanley, Paul Amato, and Barbara Markey. Id. at 2.
199. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 185, at 180.
200. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 83–88.
201. Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009).
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Singer identifies several “related components” of this paradigm shift, or
what she calls a “velvet revolution.”202 Some of those components feature in
Huntington’s book as exemplary of the direction in which Huntington would
like dispute-resolution family law to move.203 Family law scholars and
practitioners are likely to view these components as far enough established
as to be institutionalized rather than “a few narrow reforms.”204
Huntington acknowledges (in a footnote) that Singer argues that these
reforms “are more comprehensive”205 but does not explain why she implicitly
resists Singer’s evaluation. Some of the changes that Singer details, such as
the shift to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), reflect trends that began
forty or fifty years ago.206 Pertinent to Huntington’s concerns about postdissolution cooperative parenting, at the Pound Conference—a “defining
event” in the ADR movement held in April 1976—participants stressed
mediation as “better for litigants who had continuing relationships after the
trial was over because it emphasized their common interests rather than those
that divided them.”207 Other developments in this paradigm shift, such as
court-affiliated parent education programs, date back to the 1990s and have
taken hold more strongly since then.208 Singer also makes the intriguing
observation that changes in substantive family law toward this new paradigm
have facilitated changes in that direction in dispute-resolution family law and
vice versa.209 Directly relevant to Huntington’s focus on the negative impact
of both types of family law on children, Singer argues that the shift from the
sole-custody paradigm to an “unmediated best-interests” of the child standard
has facilitated a shift “from adversarial to nonadversarial resolution of
divorce-related parenting disputes,” even as “the shift from adversarial to
nonadversarial dispute resolution” has affected the legal norms governing
custody cases, with a shift from custody judgments to parenting plans.210
It is illuminating—and illustrative of the perceived link between strong,
healthy families and a strong nation—that nearly all of the elements Singer

202. Id. For elaboration of these components, see infra notes 215–48 and accompanying text.
203. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xvi (listing several reforms that embody principles
advocated by Huntington, including laws allowing joint custody, the “widespread use of mediation,”
and that “some lawyers already adopt a more conciliatory, cooperative approach to family
conflicts”).
204. Contra id. (arguing that these “few narrow reforms” are still “haphazard, unconnected,
and sometimes actively challenged”).
205. Id. at 276 n.135.
206. See ANDREW L. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 50 (2004).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 68–69.
209. Jana B. Singer, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close
Connection Between Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related Parenting Disputes, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177–78 (2014).
210. Id.
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identifies as part of the paradigm shift featured in the recommendations for a
“family-friendly court” made in a 1996 report by the U.S. Commission on
Child and Family Welfare, Parenting Our Children: In the Best Interests of
the Nation.211 The report recommends, for example, changing the
nomenclature away from custody and visitation to language of parenting time
and responsibility, requiring parents to draft parenting plans, involving
mediation in contested custody cases, requiring parent education, and
improving access to the courts for unmarried parents.212 Notably, similar to
Huntington’s call for an assessment of the impact of law on relationships, the
Commission recommends: “Governments at all levels should evaluate laws
and policies with respect to their effects on families.”213 The report also
offers many recommendations about the vital role of communities in
empowering families, both with respect to family formation, parenting, and
mentoring, as well as to “support the development and public awareness of
effective community-based, non-court, dispute resolution, and family
support programs that can help family members resolve disputes and address
the consequences of divorce.”214
Many of the reforms recommended in Parenting Our Children are now
part of the paradigm shift Singer detects in family law. First is “a profound
skepticism about the value of traditional adversary procedures” as “ill suited
for resolving disputes involving children.”215 Influenced by social science
findings about the critical role parents’ behavior during and after separation
plays on children’s adjustment, “academics and court reformers have argued
that family courts should abandon the adversary paradigm in favor of
approaches that help parents manage their conflict and encourage them to
develop positive postdivorce coparenting relationships.”216 Moreover,
family courts have “embraced this insight” by adopting “an array of
nonadversary dispute resolution mechanisms designed to avoid adjudication
of family cases.”217
The paradigm shift is also evident in the practice of family lawyers, who,
in increasing numbers, have “rejected the adversary paradigm, in favor of a
collaborative law model.”218 In the early 1990s, for example, the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) adopted standards of conduct
for divorce lawyers, Bounds of Advocacy,219 out of a conviction that there

211. U.S. COMM’N ON CHILD & FAMILY WELFARE, PARENTING OUR CHILDREN: IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE NATION 3–5 (1996) [hereinafter PARENTING OUR CHILDREN].
212. Id. at 29–43.
213. Id. at 62.
214. Id. at 52–56.
215. Singer, supra note 201, at 363.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 364.
218. Id.
219. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (1991).
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was a tension between the zealous advocacy required by existing professional
responsibility rules and the realities of divorce practice and that competent
representation could include a problem-solving approach mindful of the
client’s children and family.220 The aspirational guidelines the AAML
adopted are very much in keeping with Huntington’s vision. They recognize
that divorce presents human and emotional problems as well as legal
problems and recommend that attorneys advise their clients about the
economic and emotional impact of divorce and explore “the possibility or
advisability of reconciliation.”221
Recognizing that a cooperative resolution of matrimonial disputes is
“desirable,” an attorney should consider ADR methods;222 and, if
representing a parent, “should consider the welfare of, and seek to minimize
the adverse impact of the divorce, on minor children.”223 In Divorce Lawyers
at Work, Lynn Mather and her colleagues found that divorce attorneys
understand advocacy by reference to a model of the “reasonable lawyer,”
which, although it differs by community of practice, generally finds the
zealous advocacy model inapt for family law disputes.224 Their research
confirms prior work finding that “divorce lawyers dampen legal conflict far
more than they exacerbate it and generally try to avoid adversarial actions.”225
By contrast, Huntington relies on one study finding “that family-law
practitioners are far more likely to engage in relationship-destroying,
adversarial behavior than lawyers in any other type of practice.”226 That
study, however, is problematic both for its small sample size and ambiguity
about how it defined family lawyers.227 Huntington’s critique of family
lawyers misses the significance of context. If a family lawyer in a high-stakes
divorce, with lots of assets or contested custody and lots of resources with
which to wage battle, faces an opponent with a winner-take-all or zero-sum
mentality or is negotiating with a very aggressive opponent, then that lawyer

220. LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK 113 (2001).
221. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, supra note 219, R. 2.12.
222. Id. R. 1.4 cmt.
223. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY R. 6.1 (2000).
224. MATHER ET AL., supra note 220, at 111.
225. Id. at 114.
226. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 88.
227. E-mail from Lynn Mather, Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School, to author (Sept. 20,
2014, 12:28 EST) (on file with author). Lynn Mather reviewed the 2006 study on which Huntington
relies, Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are Really Doing When
They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612 (2006), and observed certain weaknesses in the study. First,
the sample sizes are too small; out of 578 attorneys surveyed, only 10.6% (or 61) were “family
lawyers,” and only 14.8% (or 9) of those family lawyers were “unethically adverse.” Id. at 616
tbl.4; see also E-mail from Lynn Mather, supra. Second, the study does not indicate clearly how it
defines family lawyers, so that generalist lawyers handling family law cases, who are more likely
to get caught up in the emotions of their client and behave adversarially, may be skewing the results.
E-mail from Lynn Mather, supra.
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will “play the game,” but it may not be the game the lawyer prefers.228 Apart
from such high-stakes cases, family lawyers practice mindful of the fact that
the parties will be dealing with each other on an ongoing basis concerning
children.229
The second element, Singer observes, is “the belief that most family
disputes are not discrete legal events, but ongoing social and emotional
processes.”230 When family disputes are thus “recharacterized,” they “call
not for zealous legal approaches, but for interventions that are collaborative,
holistic, and interdisciplinary because these are the types of interventions
most likely to address the families [sic] underlying dysfunction and
emotional needs.”231
The third element in the paradigm shift is a “reformulation of the goal
of legal intervention in the family” from a “backward-looking process,
designed primarily to assign blame and allocate rights” to a paradigm in
which a judge “assume[s] the forward-looking task of supervising a process
of family reorganization.”232 Indeed, family law teachers readily will
recognize that the goal of family “reorganization” is pervasive in discussions
of the tasks that legal and nonlegal professionals face in helping “families in
transition,” including preparing divorcing or never-married parents for
coparenting.233 The slogan, “‘parents are forever, even if marriages are
not,’”234 captures this idea and stands in sharp contrast to the “clean break”
idea that informs other aspects of divorce.235 This forward-looking,
reorganizing approach applies not only to divorcing couples with children
but also to never married parents. This development seems particularly
resonant with Huntington’s call for a flourishing state to help foster strong,
stable, and positive relationships and to repair relationships so that they can
help parents to coparent and children to flourish. Therapeutic jurisprudence
(a movement praised by Huntington) “embodies this forward-looking

228. MATHER ET AL., supra note 220, at 128–30 (describing how family lawyers may prefer a
cooperative negotiation style, but instead adopt an adversarial style in response to an adversarial
opponent).
229. Lynn Mather & Craig A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The
Challenges of Divorce Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
CONTEXT 63, 79 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (finding that many family law
specialists “held strong views, consistent with the AAML, that the interests of children should
temper zealous advocacy on behalf of a client”).
230. Singer, supra note 201, at 364.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., IAALS’ Honoring Families Initiative: Courts and
Communities Helping Families in Transition Arising from Separation or Divorce, 51 FAM. CT. REV.
351, 353, 370 (2013) (explaining the risks involved during transitional times when families are
reorganizing after separation or divorce).
234. SCHEPARD, supra note 206, at 45 & 193 n.149 (quoting a sign on a wall of a Los Angeles
mediation program office).
235. Singer, supra note 201, at 366.

MCCLAIN.TOPRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

738

1/29/2015 6:04 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 93:705

orientation” so that “legal intervention in the family strives not merely to
resolve disputes, but to improve the material and psychological well-being of
individuals and families in conflict.”236
The fourth element follows from the third: “[T]o achieve these
therapeutic goals, family courts have adopted systems that deemphasize
third-party dispute resolution in favor of capacity-building processes that
seek to empower families to resolve their own conflicts.”237 This focus on
capacity building seems akin to Huntington’s argument, in the child-welfare
context, to focus on the strengths that families have and to empower them to
solve their problems.238
Many developments in family law and family courts illustrate this
emphasis on helping family members resolve their own conflicts in a way
that will foster child well-being and reduce hostility between parents. These
programs may not explicitly use the language of “repairing” relationships but
seem in keeping with a flourishing family law’s aim of facilitating
cooperative coparenting relationships between people who are no longer
intimate partners. It is puzzling that, although Huntington acknowledges that
some of these programs exist, her book does not suggest the extent to which
these programs are not simply islands of reform but institutionalized as a new
approach to family conflict.
Consider parent education programs. A recent inventory of parent
education in the family courts dated the “first documented parent education
programs” to the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the first court-mandated
program in 1986.239 Parent education programs “proliferated rapidly in the
1990s”; by 1998, a national survey reported “that 44 states had state or local
laws authorizing courts to require attendance at a program.”240 Today, with
such programs “operating in 46 states” and popular with courts and users,
parent education is institutionalized and part of the present-day landscape of
dispute-resolution family law.241
A primary reason for requiring parent education plans is to ameliorate
the effects of parental conflict on children.242 Parenting Our Children, for
example, quoted Judith Wallerstein: “Conflict can destroy . . . [.] What
protects the child is a civil, rational, responsible relationship between [the]

236. Id. at 364.
237. Id.
238. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 131–37 (describing family group conferences as premised
on the principle that “families have strengths and are capable of changing the problems in their
lives”).
239. Peter Salem et al., Taking Stock of Parent Education in the Family Courts: Envisioning a
Public Health Approach, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 131, 132 (2013).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 133.
242. Id. at 135.
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parents and realistic planning that is sensitive to the [needs of the] growing
child.”243
The pervasiveness of parent education programs does not, admittedly,
guarantee that such programs actually are lessening parental conflict or
fostering healthy relationships.244 Some literature on parent education
explicitly embraces a public health or ecological model, speaking of the role
parent education can play in changing some of the most important risk and
protective factors for children from divorce, since high levels of parental
conflict and a “poor co-parenting relationship” are among those factors.245
The focus on educating parents about risk and protective factors suggests an
ecological approach.
Finally, the “fifth component of the paradigm shift is an increased
emphasis on predispute planning and preventive law.”246 This component
seems particularly in keeping with Huntington’s critique of family law for
being too focused on the back end, when a family is in crisis, rather than on
preventative and facilitative measures.247 Parenting plans, long proposed by
the AAML and more recently by the American Law Institute, have this
future-directed, dispute-prevention focus, including “a mechanism for
periodic review or a process for resolving future disagreements” by means,
ideally, that do not involve court intervention.248
Related developments in family law that Huntington views more as a
hopeful sign than as a significant shift are the move away from the language
of custody and visitation to the language of parenting responsibility and
parenting time and the shift from the sole custody model to shared
parenting.249 Proponents of such changes argued that the changes would
“have a positive impact on parental cooperation and the well-being of
children.”250
As Singer notes, this paradigm shift brings with it some concerns and
challenges relevant to Huntington’s reparative model. Consider shared
parenting. Context and class matter in assessing the place and impact of this
norm in family law. Carbone and Cahn argue that what they call the “upper
third,” married, college-educated parents, follow a new marital script in
which “[m]en are expected to play a larger role in their children’s lives, and
while women are freer to leave unhappy relationships, they no longer control
access to the child in the process of doing so,” given the legal regime favoring

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

PARENTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 211, at 32 (quoting Judith Wallerstein).
Salem et al., supra note 239, at 135–36.
Id. at 139–40.
Singer, supra note 201, at 365.
See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
Id. at 364–65.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 124–26, 130–31.
PARENTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 211, at 30.

MCCLAIN.TOPRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

740

1/29/2015 6:04 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 93:705

shared parenting.251 But what of unmarried parents or parents in an unstable
marriage? Feminist readers of Huntington might fear that in a world of
flourishing family law, a pervasive state encouraging coparenting will, in
effect, force mothers who do not want to deal with the biological fathers of
their children to deal with them as legal coparents and will not yield much by
way of positive benefits to the children, while limiting such women’s ability
to choose a man who has taken responsibility for the child to be the legal
father.252
Another concern is whether, in the case of children born to young people
who “drift” into parenthood and lack a stable relationship, the goal of
cementing a long-term, coparenting relationship is realistic. Huntington
herself acknowledges that factors like “family instability and multipartner
fertility make it harder for parents and children to maintain strong, stable,
positive relationships.”253 Selectivity in picking “the right partner”
contributes, Cahn and Carbone argue, to relationship stability; what can the
“pervasive state” do to address the problem that “many intimate relationships
today are characterized by ‘quick entrees, partners gathering little evidence
about trustworthiness, limited interdependence, and an emphasis on partners
meeting specific immediate needs’”?254 Is “parallel parenting,” in which
parents each rear a child in appropriate ways and do not undermine each
other, rather than a model of parents actively communicating and sharing
responsibility for major decisions, a better aim?255 Certainly, parallel
parenting may lead to cooperative parenting, but it may not.256 But it is not
clear “repair” is the operative concept.
In sum, Singer seems to have the more persuasive argument that a
paradigm shift has occurred. Undeniably, there is a shortfall between the
normative commitments to a new paradigm and practical realities on the
ground. On the one hand, many innovative programs are in place in family
courts, in communities, and in family law practice that have moved from an
adversarial paradigm to a problem-solving or collaborative model. On the
other hand, material constraints like budget cuts threaten such programs and
overcrowded dockets also tax the court system. Moreover, the rise of pro se
representation means more people will not have legal representation.257 But
that does not mean a new normative paradigm is needed. Huntington’s

251. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 185, at 126–27.
252. Id. at 136–40 (discussing approaches to the marital presumption and pointing out how
some approaches control women and impinge on their decision-making authority).
253. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 156.
254. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 185, at 180 (quoting Linda M. Burton et al., The Role of
Trust in Low-Income Mothers’ Intimate Unions, 71 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1107, 1122 (2009)).
255. SCHEPARD, supra note 206, at 35–36, 101–02.
256. Id.
257. For a sobering account of the potential causes and impact of the rise in pro se
representation, see Kourlis et al., supra note 233, at 357.
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positive vision for flourishing family law fits more or less comfortably into
shifts already under way. As one scholar recently concluded, “the challenge
fundamentally is one of translation” so that the benefits of the family law
revolution are more widely available, particularly to the “high proportion” of
participants in family court who lack an attorney or have “limited to modest
resources.”258
V.

Conclusion

In this Review, I have argued that it is a propitious time to consider
whether there is a way forward in the war over the family. I have situated
Failure to Flourish within the context both of previous calls to strengthen
families as well as two present-day conversations about marriage, family law,
and equality that too often proceed parallel to, but independent of, each other.
Through her invitation to focus on why family relationships matter and the
conditions under which children in particular flourish, Huntington, a “village
builder,” nonetheless finds some common ground with “traditionalists.” Her
arguments about how to deploy the pervasive state—and family law—to
foster flourishing relationships are a useful complement to other theories of
the state, such as Fineman’s vulnerability theory, focused on the role of
societal institutions in providing resources and building resilience and of the
state in bringing into being and maintaining those institutions.259 Moving
forward, both the relational and institutional focus are vital and, in a sense,
are another way to think about the channeling function of law in creating and
supporting social institutions that allow realization of important goods or
ends.260
I have disagreed with parts of Huntington’s critique of “negative” family
law, countering that, at least with respect to dispute resolution family law in
the context of family dissolution involving minor children, there is a
concerted shift toward reducing “war” between family members to make
peaceful legal proceedings and coparenting possible. Nonetheless, in my
view, most of her positive agenda, from (as Sawhill proposes) encouraging
young people to delay childbearing and parenting until they are ready and
capable, to supporting parents in their “critical work” of child development,
to attending to the environments in which families live, is sound and
unobjectionable. It is similar to many progressive calls for a new family
agenda. I support a marriage plus agenda that declines to move completely

258. Deborah Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 63, 64–65,
96 (2012).
259. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and
Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND
POLITICS 13, 20–26 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013).
260. See id. at 25 (“The state is always at least a residual actor in the formation and functioning
of society and should accept some responsibility in regard to the effects and operation of those
institutions it brings into being and helps to maintain.”).
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“beyond marriage” but instead supports marriage while nurturing other
family and relationship forms.261 Perhaps Failure to Flourish will invite
conversation about why, with so many decades of calls not just to talk about
family values but to implement policies that “value families,” there is still
such a shortfall and how it may be possible to better realize those values.

261. See MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 191–219 (arguing for a model that supports many
different kinds of familial relationships).

